Red lights in Côtes-d'Armor, France

Thanks to new technical means (software) and the investigation experience gained over all these recent years, this re-examination sometimes leads to new remarks or even a change of classification. This observation case, previously classified D and named LANNION (22) 1980, is part of a set of cases recently re-examined. On September 5, 1980 at 10:45 PM, eight witnesses were surprised by a luminous phenomenon above the ocean. Of these eight witnesses, only three were interviewed by the competent gendarmerie on September 8, 1980. During the interviews, the witnesses (T1 and T2) described two very luminous red balls leaving a trail in the sky. The vehicle occupants (T1 and T2) had the impression that these balls were approaching and following them. Seized with fear, they took refuge at the home of a resident (T3) of PLESTIN-LES-GREVES (22), who also saw a very luminous red ball at the top of the fir trees bordering the cemetery. Her observation lasted a few seconds, then she brought everyone inside her home to reassure them. The appearance of the UAPs as described by the witnesses (ball shape, red color, strong luminosity, presence of a trail) fits perfectly with the main working hypothesis, namely confusion with two distress flares of the "parachute flare" type (see the investigation report). The initial observation places the UAPs above the ocean, in or near the bay of Saint-Michel-des-Grèves, which reinforces the hypothesis, such flares being launched from the ocean. Regarding the behavior of the UAPs relative to the hypothesis, the illusion of the "following ball," for distant objects, explains the impression the witnesses had, while moving in their vehicle, that the UAPs were following them, stopping when they did the same, etc. The other behavioral characteristic of the UAPs is the "enlargement" noted by the witnesses, interpreted as an "approach" toward their vehicle, which is not necessarily the case. This can very well be explained by an increase in the luminosity of the flares, once the illuminating charge is triggered, making them appear artificially larger, and therefore seeming closer. The only element of inconsistency that persists with this hypothesis is that of duration. Although the testimonies regarding the initial observation position at Saint-Efflam can be interpreted in two different ways, both valid, the time taken by the witnesses to cover the distance separating them from the initial observation point to the final point (corresponding to the observation duration, i.e., between 60 and 90 seconds) is longer than the visibility duration of distress parachute flares, which never exceeds 45 seconds. Various hypotheses have been put forward to try to explain this inconsistency. One of them particularly caught our attention: that of two successive launches of two parachute flares. Since the visibility of these flares occurs once apogee is reached, and being launched in the same direction, they can appear visible, from the witnesses' position, at the same place in the sky. Furthermore, during the second launch, visibility being poorer (the flares being observed from the rear of the vehicle) and panic spreading inside the cabin, the witnesses probably did not pay attention to the transition between the two launches, the general panic reducing their ability to discern. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable and precise data to consolidate the hypothesis. The testimonial data are indeed imprecise, particularly regarding the observation durations of the different phases. We would also have liked to have more details concerning possible interruptions in observation, by one or another of the witnesses, throughout the journey. These data are unverifiable more than 35 years after the facts. Although the inconsistencies related to the observation duration can theoretically be explained, in practice the lack of precise data prevents a classification of "B," possible confusion with distress flares of the "parachute flare" type. Consequently, the appropriate classification for this case is "C," the lack of data not allowing a sufficiently solid opinion to be established.